The History Behind The Vietnam War

The Insurgency Grows

As violent insurgency became the prevalent choice of the southern communists,Ho Chi Minh encouraged those who felt violence necessary to restrain their efforts,Minh recognized it was vital for the communists to maintain their popular appeal

Between 1956 and 1960 the insurgency in the south would gain momentum. While assassinations initially targeted only members of the Diem regime they began to target anybody affiliated with the status quo including agriculture officials, health workers and even teachers. In 1959 the Central Committee of North Vietnam authorized “armed struggle” in secret and began supplying troops, supplies and munitions by way of the infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail. As Diem became increasingly unpopular, the North Vietnamese government authorized the formation of the National Liberation Front, a communist organization that would form the backbone of their reunification efforts in the south.

As President Kennedy took office in the US in 1960 he was beset by what seemed a rising tide of communism internationally. His initial focus was on Europe and South America, but when the Bay of Pigs failed, the Berlin Wall was erected, and Laos came to an agreement with the Pathet Lao, Kennedy felt that the credibility of the United States as a friend and ally was on the line.

Even though Kennedy was opposed to full conflict in Vietnam he felt that the Green Berets, units initially tasked with guerrilla assignments in occupied Europe during World War 2, would be useful in countering guerrilla communist movements in the third world, including Vietnam.

The primary focus of the military efforts under Kennedy was to train the South Vietnamese military to handle the effort, a similar approach to what both Truman and Eisenhower had used in the region. Perhaps the biggest problem with this strategy was the fact that due to Diem’s practice of nepotism the officer corps of the South Vietnamese army was riddled with inexperienced, ineffective battle commanders who would often break down under the pressure of an assault.

Despite Kennedy refusing to engage combat troops for fear of the long term repercussions the US presence in Vietnam steadily increased under his administration, reaching 16,000 troops by 1963. In an attempt to win over the common people the US had begun the Strategic Hamlet Program in 1961, relocating rural Vietnamese farmers into villages that could be secured more effectively to try and win their trust and keep them away from the communist resistance. Unfortunately many of those placed in these hamlets resented the relocation. Couple this with the ineptitude of the Diem regime and it is no surprise the National Liberation Front continued to gain ground among the common Vietnamese.

It soon became apparent that Diem was more focused on maintaining his own power and fending off coups than defeating the communists. His most trusted general Huynh Van Cao was defeated by a smaller Viet Cong force at the battle of Ap Bac in January of 1963. Cao was given his promotion not for his skill, but rather for his loyalty to Diem.

This was followed by the Hue Vesak shootings, a lethal response to Buddhist protestors, and subsequent raids against Buddhist pagodas. Vietnam being mostly Buddhist was outraged with these policies.

In the summer of 1963 the United States recognized that Diem’s alienation of his own populace was playing into the hands of the communists and began seeking to replace him. The CIA had made contact with several generals who were considering a military coup against Diem and while they gave no support they did give a tacit nod of approval. In November of 1963 Diem was deposed and summarily executed.   

The Post Diem Era :

The coup would be the first of several in South Vietnam each serving to destabilize that fragile government. Hanoi in the north would take advantage of the chaos by increasing their support of the NLF. Ultimately, each regime that followed Diem’s was plagued by the ghost of being a US puppet. Despite Diem’s unpopularity he had been a well known nationalist. The following military regimes however were all perceived as pawns of an interloping United States.

A military council made up of 12 generals would initially replace Diem, headed by General Duong Van Minh. was characterized by one journalist as a “model of lethargy” and his administration was short lived, he would be replaced in less than 4 months by General Nguyen Khanh.

Twenty days after the death of Diem, President Kennedy was assassinated. The new President, Lyndon Johnson, would radically depart from the course of action that previous administrations had followed in Vietnam. While Johnson was initially focused more on domestic matters he would ultimately change US policy towards Vietnam in a dramatic way.

In August of 1964 an incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. The official story was that two vessels, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy, had come into conflict with torpedo boats while conducting intelligence missions in the gulf. The truth of what occurred may never be certain, but even Johnson speculated that the US naval men might have merely been “shooting at flying fish.”

With that story came the Gulf of Tonkin resolution from the US congress which authorized the President to conduct military operations in the region without the need to declare war. Retaliatory air strikes against the north also began following the Tonkin incident.

While there is no evidence that the military intentionally falsified reports of the Tonkin incident it is clear that several key members of the US military were frustrated with the situation and took advantage of the incident’s uncertainty to justify an increased military response.

In March of 1965 an attack against the US barracks at Pleiku would result in the initiation of a massive campaign of air strikes against North Vietnam. Operations Flaming Dart, Rolling Thunder, and Arc Light would all commence. For three years the US would bomb many of North Vietnam’s industrial and military facilities. The campaigns were designed to boost southern morale and reduce the industrial and military capacity of the north, hopefully diminishing the assistance Hanoi was able to provide to the NLF in the south.

Despite the fact that Rolling Thunder alone used a million tons of ordinance and other operations targeted the Ho Chi Minh trail, the primary supply line of the NLF, Hanoi’s support would continue. The drawback to these operations was their political ramification and Vietnam was ultimately a political conflict.

US troops had been stationed in Vietnam in serious numbers starting in January of 1965 with Da Nang Air Force Base. Once the air strikes began in March the various airfields would see attacks coming from the Viet Cong. In March 3,500 Marines were sent to Vietnam to defend the airbases from attack, thus beginning US involvement in the ground war.

While the US public initially supported this deployment, they did so under the premise that Vietnam was a factor in the global battle against the spread of Communism. The official policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was to reunify Vietnam. There was no plan to later topple non-communist states or spread communism to the neighboring nations of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh went on record as saying “If the Americans want to make war for 20 years, then we shall make war for 20 years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea.”

The initial assignment for the Marines in Vietnam was defensive in nature. From the initial number of 3,500, the number of troops would swell to almost 200,000 by December. While the US military was well suited for and trained in offensive tactics, they were generally not prepared for a long term defensive posture.

After a series of South Vietnamese defeats and morale quickly flagging, General William Westmoreland proposed a radical shift in how the US fought in Vietnam. Rather than maintaining a defensive posture, Westmoreland believed that the US could succeed if it took an aggressive offensive stance against the opposing Viet Cong.

President Johnson would approve Westmoreland’s proposals, even though he maintained that the US policy remained the same. Under the command of Westmoreland the United States entered into a war of attrition with the communist forces, locking the nation into a brutal cycle of escalation. By this point any notion that the South Vietnamese government could handle the situation on its own was dismissed.

The US presence in Vietnam was nothing like it had been in previous conflicts. There were no secure areas for rest and relaxation as there had been during the two world wars. Most soldiers would serve a one year tour of duty leading to a shortage of experienced combat ready officers and troops. While the US did have some allies, such as Australia and New Zealand, the United Kingdom and other NATO nations refused to send troops.

The US policy of trying to “spin” the war for the media only resulted in distrust and dissatisfaction at home. As the independent media’s coverage became increasingly discordant with the official story coming from the Pentagon there developed a significant credibility gap. While the US government had often been trusted by the citizens in the past an increasing number of Americans felt they could no longer rely on their government to be honest with them.

General Westmoreland had become the face of the US war effort appearing in many newspapers and periodicals such as Time magazine. He remained confident that the US could win the war and was on the verge of assuring US victory by late 1967. During a speech given to the National Press Club in November of 1967 Westmoreland proclaimed that a point had been reached “where the end comes into view” in the war.  

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